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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A FRAMEWORK
FOR ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
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Abstract Existing approaches to ‘algorithmic accountability’, such as
transparency, provide an important baseline, but are insuﬃcient to address
the (potential) harm to human rights caused by the use of algorithms in
decision-making. In order to eﬀectively address the impact on human rights,
we argue that a framework that sets out a shared understanding and means of
assessing harm; is capable of dealing with multiple actors and diﬀerent forms
of responsibility; and applies across the full algorithmic life cycle, from
conception to deployment, is needed. While generally overlooked in
debates on algorithmic accountability, in this article, we suggest that
international human rights law already provides this framework. We apply
this framework to illustrate the eﬀect it has on the choices to employ
algorithms in decision-making in the ﬁrst place and the safeguards required.
While our analysis indicates that in some circumstances, the use of
algorithms may be restricted, we argue that these ﬁndings are not ‘anti-
innovation’ but rather appropriate checks and balances to ensure that
algorithms contribute to society, while safeguarding against risks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Oﬀering greater eﬃciency, reduced costs, and new insights into current and
predicted behaviour or trends,1 the use of algorithms to make or support
decisions is increasingly central to many areas of public and private life.2
* Professor of International HumanRights Law, EssexLawSchool, Director, HumanRights Centre,
University of Essex and Principal Investigator and Director, ESRC Human Rights, Big Data and
Technology Project, lmcgreg@essex.ac.uk; Senior Lecturer, School of Law & Human Rights Centre,
University ofEssex,DeputyWorkStreamLead, ESRCHumanRights, BigData&TechnologyProject,
d.murray@essex.ac.uk; Senior Research Oﬃcer, ESRC Human Rights, Big Data & Technology
Project, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, vivian.ng@essex.ac.uk. This work was
supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/M010236/1].
1 L Rainie and J Anderson, ‘Code-Dependent: Pros and Cons of the Algorithm Age’ (Pew
Research Center, February 2017) 30–1 <http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/02/08/code-dependent-
pros-and-cons-of-the-algorithm-age>; R Kitchin, ‘Thinking Critically About and Researching
Algorithms’ (2017) 20(1) Information, Communication & Society 14, 18–19.
2 See egHJWilson, AAlter and P Shukla, ‘Companies Are Reimagining Business Processwith
Algorithms’ (Harvard Business Review, 8 February 2016) <https://hbr.org/2016/02/companies-are-
reimagining-business-processes-with-algorithms>.
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However, the use of algorithms is not new. An algorithm, as deﬁned by the
Oxford English Dictionary, is simply ‘[a] process or set of rules to be
followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations, especially by a
computer’.3 An early example is the use of handwritten algorithms to count
votes and determine a winner in the electoral process. What accounts for the
increasing centrality of algorithms in contemporary society is their
transformational potential. For example, advances in computational power
mean that modern algorithms can execute complex tasks beyond human
capability and speed, self-learn to improve performance, and conduct
sophisticated analysis to predict likely future outcomes. Modern algorithms
are fuelled by easily accessible large and/or diverse datasets that can be
aggregated and processed eﬃciently (often labelled ‘big data’).4 These
algorithms exist in a complex, interdependent, global data ecosystem
whereby algorithmically produced outputs can be used as new input data for
other algorithmic processes.5
The interaction and interdependence of algorithms, including artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI) or machine-learning algorithms, and big data have enabled
their deployment in many key areas of decision-making, such that many
functions traditionally carried out by humans have become increasingly
automated. For example, algorithms are used to: assist in sentencing and
parole decisions; predict crime ‘hotspots’ to allocate police resources;
personalize search engine results, electronic newsfeeds and advertisements;
detect fraud; determine credit ratings; facilitate recruitment; and deliver
healthcare and legal services. The advent of self-driving cars underscores the
speed at which technology is developing to enable more complex
autonomous decision-making.6
Given the extent of their societal impact, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
use of algorithms in decision-making raises a number of human rights
concerns. The risk of discrimination arising from the use of algorithms in a
wide range of decisions from credit scoring to recidivism models has already
been well documented.7 The range of contexts in which algorithms are used
also generates other less studied threats to human rights. For instance,
automated credit scoring can aﬀect employment and housing rights; the
increasing use of algorithms to inform decisions on access to social security
potentially impacts a range of social rights; the use of algorithms to assist
with identifying children at risk may impact upon family life; algorithms
3 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Deﬁnition of algorithm’ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
deﬁnition/algorithm>.
4 For instance, from metadata, smart technology and the Internet of Things.
5 JM Balkin, ‘2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The
Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 78(5) OhioStLJ 1217, 1219.
6 Select Committee on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, Corrected Oral Evidence: Artiﬁcial Intelligence,
Evidence Session No. 1 (HL 2017–2019), 10 October 2017 Evidence Session <http://data.
parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artiﬁcial-intelligence-
committee/artiﬁcial-intelligence/oral/71355.pdf> 2, 9. 7 See discussion Part IIA.
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used to approve or reject medical intervention may aﬀect the right to health;
while algorithms used in sentencing decisions aﬀect the right to liberty.8
In recent years a multi-disciplinary literature has developed on ‘algorithmic
accountability’.9 Proposals for achieving better accountability for decisions
made or supported by algorithms have focused either on technical solutions,
such as blockchain,10 or modalities for improving the transparency of
algorithmic systems, making their decision-making process more
understandable and explainable, and creating rules in algorithmic
programmes to prevent or detect unfair outcomes.11 While each of these
approaches constitutes a necessary element of accountability, in our view,
they are incomplete due to their focus on speciﬁc aspects of the overall
algorithmic process. Instead, the complex nature of algorithmic decision-
making necessitates that accountability proposals be set within a wider
framework, addressing the overall algorithmic life cycle, from the conception
and design phase, to actual deployment and use of algorithms in decision-
making. In light of the diverse range of actors involved, this framework also
needs to take into account the rights and responsibilities of all relevant actors.
This article contributes to the literature on algorithmic accountability by
proposing an approach based on international human rights law (IHRL) as a
means to address the gaps we identify in current proposals for ‘algorithmic
accountability’.12 Under IHRL, States are required to put in place a
framework that prevents human rights violations from taking place,
establishes monitoring and oversight mechanisms as safeguards, holds those
responsible to account, and provides a remedy to individuals and groups who
claim that their rights have been violated.13 These obligations apply directly to
State actions or omissions and, through the principle of due diligence, the State
8 See discussion Parts IIIA, IVA and IVB.
9 See discussion Part IIB; JA Kroll et al., ‘Accountable Algorithms’ (2017) 165(3) UPaLRev
633; S Barocas, S Hood and M Ziewitz, ‘Governing Algorithms: A Provocation Piece’ (Governing
Algorithms Conference (New York University, 29 March 2013); M Ananny and K Crawford,
‘Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of The Transparency Ideal and Its Application to
Algorithmic Accountability’ (2018) 20(3) New Media & Society 973; DK Citron and F Pasquale,
‘The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions’ (2014) 89(1)WashLRev 1; T Zarsky,
‘The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Eﬃciency and
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making’ (2016) 41(1) Science, Technology &
Human Values 118; N Diakopoulos, ‘Algorithmic Accountability: Journalistic Investigation of
Computational Power Structures’ (2015) 3(3) Digital Journalism 398; S Wachter, B Mittelstadt
and C Russell, ‘Counterfactual Explanations Without Opening the Black Box: Automated
Decisions and the GDPR’ (2018) 31(2) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 841.
10 Discussed further in Part IIB.
11 These approaches tend to focus on computational methods to achieve some form of statistical
parity, which is a narrow view of giving eﬀect to the principle of equality. See discussion Part IIB;
Kitchin (n 1) 16.
12 As shorthand in this article we use the abbreviation ‘IHRL’ to refer to international human
rights law and broader norms.
13 UNHumanRights Committee, ‘General CommentNo. 31 TheNature of the Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13,
paras 3–8; UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3
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is also required to protect individuals from harm by third parties, including
business enterprises.14 IHRL also establishes an expectation that business
enterprises themselves respect human rights, for instance by undertaking
ongoing human rights due diligence ‘to identify, prevent, mitigate and
account for how they address their impact on human rights’.15
Some studies have started to emerge that identify the potential impact of AI
on human rights.16 As part of a wider discussion on regulation of the AI sector,
some commentators now also propose human rights as an addition or alternative
to ethical principles to address some of the (potential) harm posed by the
development and use of AI.17 However, these studies—and existing literature
on algorithmic accountability—have not engaged in a detailed examination of
whether and how the international human rights law framework might itself
oﬀer a response to the overall risks to human rights posed by algorithms.
This is problematic as IHRL applies to big data and new technologies just as
in any other area of life and, as argued here, oﬀers a framework through
which algorithmic accountability can be situated. This article is one of the
ﬁrst to examine ‘algorithmic accountability’ from the perspective of IHRL
TheNature of States Parties’Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN
Doc E/1991/23, paras 2–8.
14 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of The Special Representative of The Secretary-General
on The Issue of HumanRights and Transnational Corporations andOther Business Enterprises, John
Ruggie, on Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework’ (21 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, Principles
1–10 [hereinafter Ruggie Principles]. 15 ibid, Principle 15.
16 Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Internet Intermediaries (MSI-NET), ‘Algorithms
and Human Rights: Study on the Human Rights Dimensions of Automated Data Processing
Techniques and Possible Regulatory Implications’ (March 2018) Study DGI(2017)12; UN
Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
on The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (3 August 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/39/29, paras 1, 15;
F Raso et al., ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence & Human Rights: Opportunities & Risks’ (Berkman Klein
Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, 25 September 2018); M Latonero,
‘Governing Artiﬁcial Intelligence: Upholding Human Rights & Dignity’ (Data & Society, 10
October 2018); Access Now, ‘Human Rights in the Age of Artiﬁcial Intelligence’ (8 November
2018); P Molnar and L Gill, ‘Bots at the Gate: A Human Rights Analysis of Automated
Decision-Making in Canada’s Immigration and Refugee System’ (University of Toronto
International Human Rights Program and The Citizen Lab, September 2018); UN Human Rights
Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression on A Human Rights Approach to Platform Content
Regulation’ (6 April 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/35; UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the
Independent Expert on the Enjoyment of All Human Rights by Older Persons on Robots and
Rights: The Impact of Automation on the Human Rights of Older Persons’ (21 July 2017) UN
Doc A/HRC/36/48; UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Philip
Alston, ‘Statement on Visit to the United Kingdom’ (London, 16 November 2018) <https://www.
ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23881&LangID=E>; Global
Future Council on Human Rights 2016–2018, ‘White Paper: How to Prevent Discriminatory
Outcomes in Machine Learning’ (World Economic Forum, March 2018); D Allison-Hope,
‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence: A Rights-Based Blueprint for Business, Paper 2: Beyond the Technology
Industry’ (Business for Social Responsibility, August 2018).
17 See eg C van Veen and C Cath, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence: What’s Human Rights Got to Do with
It?’ (Data & Society, 14 May 2018) <https://points.datasociety.net/artiﬁcial-intelligence-whats-
human-rights-got-to-do-with-it-4622ec1566d5>.
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and to detail how human rights can inform the algorithm design, development
and deployment process.
This article does not suggest that IHRL oﬀers an exclusive or ready-made,
fully developed, solution to the issue of algorithmic accountability. The
framework itself has limitations. For example, businesses, particularly large
technology companies, are central actors in this area. However, the scope and
content of businesses’ human rights responsibilities are still in a process of
development under IHRL. While States have direct obligations to prevent
and protect human rights from third-party harm, including that caused by
businesses, the fact that global businesses operate across multiple
jurisdictions inevitably gives rise to regulatory and enforcement gaps and
inconsistencies.18 IHRL also only establishes ‘expectations’ as to how
businesses should operate, it does not currently establish direct obligations
under international law.19 Within this context, holding businesses to account
for harm caused to human rights and ensuring access to an eﬀective remedy
against global businesses, in particular, continues to be a challenge.20 The
IHRL framework also cannot resolve all the challenges related to algorithmic
accountability, some of which are addressed by other ﬁelds of law such as
data protection.
This article does not suggest that IHRL oﬀers a panacea. Rather, our
argument is that a human rights-based approach to algorithmic accountability
oﬀers an organizing framework for the design, development and deployment
of algorithms, and identiﬁes the factors that States and businesses should take
into consideration in order to avoid undermining, or violating, human rights.
This is a framework which is capable of accommodating other approaches to
algorithmic accountability—including technical solutions—and which can
grow and be built on as IHRL itself develops, particularly in the ﬁeld of
business and human rights.
18 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John
Ruggie on Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’
(7 April 2008) UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, para 3.
19 Ruggie Principles (n 14) Principle 11 and accompanying commentary. At the time of writing,
the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with respect to human rights has produced a zero draft of ‘a legally binding instrument to
regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other
business enterprises’, as mandated by UN Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9. See UN
Human Rights Council, ‘Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, In International Human Rights
Law, The Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (Zero Draft
16.7.2018).
20 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises on Access to Eﬀective Remedies
Under the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ (18 July 2017) A/72/162, para 5; UN Human Rights
Council, ‘Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Improving Accountability
and Access to Remedy for Victims of Business-Related Human Rights Abuse’ (10 May 2016) A/
HRC/32/19, para 2, 4–6.
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Some commentators have suggested that the ‘vastness, never-ending growth
and complexity of algorithmic systems’ mean that eﬀective oversight and
accountability for their use is not possible.21 Others have argued that it is too
late to develop an eﬀective oversight model, particularly in ‘an environment
dominated by corporate and government interests’.22 In our view, space
remains to address the existing and potential harm to human rights arising
from the use of algorithms in decision-making. However, the pace of
technological change and the increasingly prominent and determinative role
of algorithms mean that this task is urgent.
Part II examines existing proposals for ‘algorithmic accountability’. It does
so by ﬁrst explaining in more detail the nature of algorithms and how they can
adversely impact human rights and pose challenges for accountability. The
majority of proposals for accountability have focused on addressing the
complexity and sophistication of modern algorithms through greater
transparency and explainability. We argue that these approaches are
necessary but not suﬃcient to address the overall risks to human rights.
Greater focus on the scope and implementation of States’ obligations and the
expectations placed on businesses in relation to prevention, oversight,
accountability, and remedies is needed.
In Part III, we propose that IHRL oﬀers an appropriate framework. It does so
by setting out a number of internationally agreed substantive and procedural
rights which, if violated, constitute harm. It also provides the means to
analyse when the use of algorithms in decision-making could contribute to,
or result in, harm, even if unintentionally, and establishes a range of
obligations and requirements in relation to the identiﬁcation of, and
protection against, such eﬀects. This framework can apply holistically across
the full algorithmic life cycle from conception and design to deployment. By
incorporating and building on existing models of accountability it provides a
deeper way in which to respond to and protect against risks to human rights.
Part IV analyses the impact of this framework on the use of algorithms in
decision-making, reaching three key ﬁndings. First, IHRL may rule out the
use of algorithms in certain decision-making processes. Second, it may
require modiﬁcations or the building in of additional safeguards in order to
ensure rights compliance and thus may create a delay in deployment. Third, it
may shift debates on the unpredictability of algorithms, particularly in the future
where greater autonomy is anticipated, from a perceived reduced responsibility
to a greater responsibility for actors that deploy algorithms in the knowledge
that they cannot predict eﬀects, including to human rights. While these three
ﬁndings act as restrictions on the use of algorithms, in our view, they
constitute appropriate checks and balances. They are not intended to be ‘anti-
innovation’. Instead algorithmic decision-making is addressed in the same way
21 See Rainie and Anderson (n 1) 83. 22 ibid, 83.
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as human decision-making. The objective is to ensure that algorithms contribute
to society, while safeguarding against risks.
II. THE NATURE OF ALGORITHMS AND CURRENT ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY
DEBATES
This part begins by discussing certain characteristics associated with
algorithmic decision-making and how these pose challenges when identifying
the impact on human rights and for accountability. Existing ‘algorithmic
accountability’ proposals are then examined. Although these proposals
constitute a necessary baseline, we identify a number of remaining gaps and
challenges.
A. How the Nature of Algorithms Impacts Human Rights
At their simplest, algorithms are formulas designed to calculate a particular
result.23 Today, algorithms are typically understood as either a piece of code
or a computer application that can be used to support human decision-making
or to take actions independent of human input. There are many diﬀerent types of
algorithms. Relatively straightforward algorithms may be used to perform
mathematical calculations to compute an equation; to sort data, which can be
useful for ﬁnding patterns and connections; or to classify data on the basis of
speciﬁed criteria. These ‘traditional’ algorithms run on computer code written
by human programmers who understand their logical underpinnings and, if
required, can explain how a particular decision was reached by demonstrating
the inner workings of the system. However, modern algorithms and the manner
in which they are used are becoming increasingly sophisticated.24
Modern algorithms are used to support a range of decisions. Some of the most
reported examples involve the use of algorithms within decision-making
processes that directly aﬀect human rights. The use of algorithmically-
produced risk scores in sentencing decisions is one of the most frequently
cited examples in this respect,25 given that the risk score may have a direct
bearing on an individual’s right to liberty and the prohibition of
discrimination. Algorithmic risk assessments are also used in other sectors.
For example, an automated algorithmic-based social security system is
23 The nature of algorithms is presented simplistically here, to encapsulate their essential
elements relevant to the present discussion. There are multiple ways of understanding what an
algorithm is, its functions, and how it executes those functions. See TH Cormen et al.,
Introduction to Algorithms (3rd edn, MIT Press 2009) 5–10; DE Knuth, The Art of Computer
Programming, vol 1 (3rd edn, Addison Wesley Longman 1997) 1–9.
24 TGillespie, ‘TheRelevance of Algorithms’ in TGillespie, PJ Boczkowski andKAFoot (eds),
Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT Press 2014) 167,
192.
25 The case ofWisconsin v Eric L. Loomis, which deals with precisely this issue, is discussed in
greater detail in Part IVB.
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currently being implemented in the UK with the aim of streamlining and
improving the cost-eﬃciency of the social security payment system. The
system risks discrimination by imposing digital barriers to accessing social
security and may therefore exclude individuals with lower levels of digital
literacy or without connectivity.26 The accessibility of the system as well as
the use of risk assessments have the potential to aﬀect the human rights of
those in vulnerable positions in key areas of life, such as food, housing and
work.27 Predictive analytics may also be used in child safeguarding.28 For
instance, a tool reportedly used by London Councils, in collaboration with
private providers, combines data from multiple agencies and applies risk
scores to determine the likelihood of neglect or abuse. This raises privacy
and data protection concerns as well as issues relating to the right to family
life and discrimination.29 When algorithms are used to support a decision,
such as a risk assessment, they may introduce or accentuate existing human
rights challenges and pose new issues for accountability.
Considering these examples, the ﬁrst issue to address is whether an algorithm
may be used to make or support a decision in a particular context. Big data-
driven algorithms—such as AI or machine-learning algorithms—typically
operate on the basis of correlation and statistical probability. Algorithms
analyse large volumes of data to identify relationships between particular
inputs and a speciﬁc output, and make predictions on this basis. In this
context, a larger dataset provides a bigger sample size, which can contribute
to lower margins of error and a more accurate model. However, the nature of
big data-driven algorithms means that they generate results that describe
group behaviour, but which are not tailored to speciﬁc individuals within that
group, irrespective of the size or quality of the input dataset.30 Yet, big data-
driven algorithmic models may be used to make individually-focused
decisions. For instance, risk assessment tools, such as COMPAS in the US or
HART in the UK, are used to predict factors such as an individual’s likely
recidivism rate. These algorithms calculate individuals’ risk factor using data
particular to the individual such as their criminal history and interactions with
law enforcement but also variables such as where they live, and their
associations with others who have a criminal record.31 In eﬀect, these tools
26 UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights Philip Alston, ‘Statement on
Visit to the United Kingdom’ (n 16). 27 ibid.
28 London Councils, ‘Keeping Children Safer by Using Predictive Analytics in Social Care
Management’ <https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/our-key-themes/our-projects/london-ventures/
current-projects/childrens-safeguarding>.
29 N McIntyre and D Pegg, ‘Councils Use 377,000 People’s Data in Eﬀorts to Predict Child
Abuse’ (The Guardian, 16 September 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/sep/16/
councils-use-377000-peoples-data-in-eﬀorts-to-predict-child-abuse>.
30 E Benvenisti, ‘Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role
for the Law of Global Governance?’ (2018) 29(1) EJIL 9, 60.
31 Northpointe, ‘Practitioner’s Guide to COMPASCore’ (Northpointe, 19March 2015) Section
4.2.2 Criminal Associates/Peers and Section 4.2.8 Family Criminality <http://www.northpointeinc.
com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf>; AM Barry-Jester, B
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make determinations about the likelihood of a particular individual reoﬀending
on the basis of others who share similarities to them. It is foreseeable that these
tools could be applied not only to inform, but to actually make decisions in areas
such as sentencing, parole or entry into rehabilitation or diversion programmes.
Outside the criminal justice context and the social security and social care
contexts discussed in the previous paragraph, it is equally foreseeable that
algorithms could be used to made decisions regarding an individual’s
suitability for medical intervention, or for employment. As we discuss further
below, the nature of how algorithms work points to risks of arbitrariness,
discrimination and a range of human rights issues depending on the context.
These types of examples raise questions of whether they could ever be used
to make decisions on their own since that decision cannot be individualized.
At the moment, algorithms are typically used to support or inform decision-
making, particularly with respect to decisions that explicitly and directly
involve human rights, as in the types of examples above. The argument is
often made that any shortcomings related to the actual operation of an
algorithm may be mitigated by requiring that the algorithm only inform and
not make the decision; ie a human ‘in the loop’ acts a safeguard. However,
this gives rise to numerous issues regarding the human ‘in the loop’s’ ability
to understand how the algorithm functions and therefore to assign appropriate
weight to any recommendation. The degree of deference granted to an
automated recommendation is also at issue, as there is a risk that individuals
may be reluctant to go against an algorithmic recommendation. This may be
because of a perception that an algorithm is neutral or more accurate, or
because of the diﬃculty in explaining why the algorithmic recommendation
was overturned. This may render the human ‘in the loop’ ineﬀective.
Second, even if the human ‘in the loop’ is an eﬀective safeguard and the
algorithm is only used to inform decisions about sentencing or children at
risk, an issue of potential algorithmic bias arises. If the input data is itself
biased, say as a result of over-policing of a speciﬁc community, or if the
algorithm operates in such a way as to produce biased results, then this may
give rise to unlawful discrimination. In this regard, modern algorithms
depend on good quality input data, but this may not always be available. If
particular input data cannot be quantiﬁed or obtained, ‘proxies’ may be used
instead. However, as proxies are not an exact substitute they may be
inappropriate, inaccurate, or unreliable, aﬀecting the quality and reliability of
the results.32 One example that illustrates the pitfalls of data-driven
algorithms is credit scoring. Traditionally, credit scores were calculated on
Casselman and D Goldstein, ‘The New Science of Sentencing’ (The Marshall Project, 4 August
2015) <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/04/the-new-science-of-sentencing>.
32 See C O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and
Threatens Democracy (Penguin 2016) Introduction.
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the basis of deﬁned factors such as credit repayment history.33 With the advent
of ‘big data’, the availability of data used to inform credit decisions has
widened, and evaluation can now include information such as social media
activity and online shopping patterns.34 The argument for including these
factors is that they may provide more accurate predictions because of ‘fuller’
data proﬁles. However, these proxies for creditworthiness are problematic
and their incorporation may result in human rights harm. For instance, these
new data points may be linked to race or gender and their use may therefore
be discriminatory.35
Third, there may be a lack of transparency as to the actual operation of the
algorithm. For example, this may prevent an accused from challenging the
recommendation or risk assessment produced by an algorithm in a sentencing
decision, or may prevent a person whose level of social care or social security is
to be reduced on the basis of an algorithmic assessment from appealing. Even if
there is transparency and a person aﬀected by an algorithmically-inﬂuenced
decision wishes to challenge that decision, the nature of the algorithmic
process may make that very diﬃcult.
One issue in this respect is that a typical application brings together a
(potentially large) number of diﬀerent algorithms that interact to perform a
complex task. For instance, a number of diﬀerent algorithms may be at play
with output data from one algorithm providing input data for another.
Tracing the factors that contribute to the ﬁnal output is therefore complex.
This complexity is compounded when the development of an application is
distributed, either within an organization or through outsourcing, and when
deployments utilize input data that is diﬃcult to replicate in a test
environment.36 This diﬀuses the ability to comprehensively understand the
overall operation of an application and thus identify where and/or how
human rights issues arise.37 Equally, machine-learning algorithms can self-
learn, identify patterns, and make predictions unimagined by a human
operator, and unexplainable by humans.38 Machine-learning algorithms used
to analyse handwriting and sort letters in a post oﬃce provide an example.
The algorithm analyses a large number of handwriting samples to learn how
to classify certain pen marks, infer rules for recognizing particular letters and
33 US Executive Oﬃce of the President, Big Data: A Report on Algorithmic Systems,
Opportunity, and Civil Rights (May 2016) 11.
34 MHurley and J Adebayo, ‘Credit Scoring in the Era of BigData’ (2016) 18(1) Yale Journal of
Law & Technology 148, 151–2, 163, 166, 174–5.
35 K Waddell, ‘How Algorithms Can Bring Down Minorities’ Credit Scores’ (The Atlantic, 2
December 2016) <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/how-algorithms-can-
bring-down-minorities-credit-scores/509333/>.
36 For instance, an application may be sold to a third-party who use their own in-house data, or
who purchase data sets from data brokers. 37 See Kitchin (n 1) 21.
38 F Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and
Information (Harvard University Press 2015) 3–14.
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digits, and develop its own system for doing so.39 While a human may try to
learn when a particular pattern represents the digit ‘2’ on the basis of the
curvature of the strokes, etc, a machine-learning algorithm will analyse
markedly diﬀerent factors, such as the conﬁguration and intensity of the
shading of relevant pixels. As the algorithm’s learning process does not
replicate human logic, this creates challenges in understanding and
explaining the process.40 Machine-learning models may also ‘learn’ in real-
time,41 meaning that over time similar input data may result in diﬀerent
outputs. These systems can thus be unpredictable and opaque, which makes it
challenging to meaningfully scrutinize and assess the impact of their use on
human rights and thus to eﬀectively challenge decisions made on the basis of
algorithms. This was at issue in State of Wisconsin v Eric L Loomis,42 where
the defendant raised concerns regarding his inability to challenge the validity
or accuracy of the risk assessment produced by the COMPAS tool, which
was used to inform his sentencing decision. Issues raised by the defendant
included the problem of looking inside the algorithm to determine what
weight was given to particular information and how decisions were reached.
Diﬃculties in eﬀectively challenging the risk assessment were acknowledged
by the Court,43 which noted a number of factors suggesting caution vis-à-vis
the tool’s accuracy:
(1) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent disclosure of
information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk scores are to be
determined; (2) risk assessment compares defendants to a national sample, but
no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet been completed;
(3) some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised questions
about whether they disproportionately classify minority oﬀenders as having a
higher risk of recidivism; and (4) risk assessment tools must be constantly
monitored and re-normed for accuracy due to changing populations and
subpopulations.44
The above characteristics of the algorithmic decision-making process all pose
human rights challenges and raise diﬃculties for accountability eﬀorts. These
diﬃculties are compounded when multiple characteristics are present in the
same process, as will often be the case. Further complexities arise when the
impact of an algorithm on an individual has knock-on eﬀects for others. For
39 Y LeCun et al., ‘Learning Algorithms for Classiﬁcation: A Comparison on Handwritten Digit
Recognition’ in J-H Oh, C Kwon and S Cho (eds), Neural Networks: The Statistical Mechanics
Perspective (World Scientiﬁc 1995) 261.
40 N Bostrom and E Yudkowsky, ‘The Ethics of Artiﬁcial Intelligence’ in K Frankish and W
Ramsey (eds), Cambridge Handbook of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (Cambridge University Press
2014) 316, 316–17.
41 As distinct from learning on the basis of training data, and then being deployed to a real-world
context. 42 State of Wisconsin v Eric L. Loomis 2016 WI 68, 881 N.W.2d 749.
43 Although they were not held to be decisive in respect to the matter at hand.
44 State of Wisconsin v Eric L. Loomis (n 42) para 66.
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instance, if credit decisions are based not only on data speciﬁc to an individual,
but are expanded to include data relating to those with whom they interact and
maintain relationships, it may amplify the discriminatory eﬀect.45 A poor credit
score for a particular individual may result in a poorer score for those in their
neighbourhood or social network.46 This potential cascade eﬀect is often
referred to as ‘networked discrimination’,47 which echoes the historically
discriminatory practice of ‘redlining’, whereby entire neighbourhoods of
ethnic minorities were denied loans by virtue of where they lived.48
To counter the potential adverse eﬀects of the way in which algorithms work
on human rights, scholars and practitioners have focused on addressing the way
in which algorithms function and their transparency, explainability and
understandability, as discussed in the next section. We argue that although
these approaches are necessary, in and of themselves they are not suﬃcient to
address the overall risks posed to human rights.
B. Existing Proposals for Algorithmic Accountability and Their Ability to
Address the Impact of Algorithms on Human Rights
The pursuit of ‘algorithmic transparency’ is a key focus of existing approaches
to algorithmic accountability. This relates to the disclosure of information
regarding how algorithms work and when they are used.49 To achieve
transparency, information must be both accessible and comprehensible.50
Transparency in this context can relate to information regarding why and
how algorithms are developed,51 the logic of the model or the overall
design,52 the assumptions underpinning the design process, how the
performance of the algorithm is monitored,53 how the algorithm itself has
changed over time,54 and factors relevant to the functioning of the algorithm,
45 See eg Lenddo, ‘Credit Scoring Solution’, <https://www.lenddo.com/pdfs/
Lenddo_FS_CreditScoring_201705.pdf>, which includes social network data in credit scores.
46 J Angwin et al., ‘Minority Neighborhoods Pay Higher Car Insurance Premiums Than White
Areas with the Same Risk’ (ProPublica, 5 April 2017) <https://www.propublica.org/article/
minority-neighborhoods-higher-car-insurance-premiums-white-areas-same-risk>; M Kamp, B
Körﬀer and M Meints, ‘Proﬁling of Customers and Consumers – Customer Loyalty Programmes
and Scoring Practices’ in M Hildebrandt and S Gutwirth (eds), Proﬁling the European Citizen:
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives (Springer 2008) 201, 207.
47 D Boyd, K Levy and A Marwick, ‘The Networked Nature of Algorithmic Discrimination’
(Open Technology Institute, October 2014).
48 Conference of Federal Savings & Loan Associations v Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1979),
aﬀ’d mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980) 1258.
49 N Diakopoulos and M Koliska, ‘Algorithmic Transparency in the News Media’ (2017) 5(7)
Digital Journalism 809, 811.
50 BDMittelstadt et al., ‘The Ethics of Algorithms:Mapping theDebate’ (2016) 3(2) BigData&
Society 6. 51 See Diakopoulos and Koliska (n 49) 816.
52 See Ananny and Crawford (n 9) 977.
53 D Kehl, P Guo and Samuel Kessler, ‘Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Assessing
the Use of Risk Assessments in Sentencing’ (July 2017) Responsive Communities 32–3.
54 See Diakopoulos and Koliska (n 49) 816.
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such as data inputs (including proxies), and the relative weight attributed to
inputs.55 Transparency can also relate to the level of human involvement,56
in order ‘to disentangle the roles and decisions of humans versus
algorithms’.57 This section discusses why transparency is valuable for
accountability, addresses challenges in achieving transparency, and highlights
remaining accountability gaps.
1. The value of transparency
The focus on transparency is a result of the nature and complexity of modern
algorithms and the view that if algorithms cannot be scrutinized, any risks to
human rights within decision-making processes will be diﬃcult to identify
and to rectify. Transparency is essential for trust, and to ensure that a system
operates within appropriate bounds.58 The ability to predict the behaviour of
an algorithm and to explain the process by which it reasons is necessary to
control, monitor, and correct the system,59 and to audit and challenge
decisions supported by algorithms.60 Understanding how an algorithm works
can also be useful in anticipating how it could perform if deployed in a
diﬀerent context.61 Some authors have asserted that transparency should be
the policy response for any governmental use of automated decision-making.62
2. Transparency challenges
Notwithstanding the importance of transparency as a normative objective, some
commentators have noted that it may be diﬃcult to achieve in practice,63
highlighting that of itself transparency may not be meaningful.64 For
example, certain algorithms can ‘learn’ and modify their operation during
55 See Kehl, Guo and Kessler (n 53) 28.
56 N Diakopoulos, ‘Accountability in Algorithmic Decision Making’ (2016) 59(2)
Communications of the ACM 56, 60. 57 See Diakopoulos and Koliska, n (n 49) 822.
58 See Diakopoulos (n 56) 58–9, 61; Diakopoulos and Koliska (n 49) 810–12; L Edwards andM
Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm:Why A ‘Right to An Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You
Are Looking For’ (2017) 16(1) Duke Law & Technology Review 18, 39; A Tutt, ‘An FDA for
Algorithms’ (2017) 69(1) Administrative Law Review 83, 110–11.
59 The Royal Society, ‘Machine Learning: The Power and Promise of Computers That Learn by
Example’ (2017) 93–4; See Tutt (n 58) 101–4.
60 SeeAnanny andCrawford (n 9) 975–7; ERamirez, Chairwoman, Federal Trade Commission,
‘Privacy Challenges in the Era of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair’ (Keynote Address
at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum, Aspen, Colorado, 19 August 2013) 8; Kehl, Guo
and Kessler (n 53) 32–3. 61 See The Royal Society (n 59) 93.
62 AR Lange, ‘Digital Decisions: Policy Tools in Automated Decision-Making’ (Center for
Democracy & Technology, 2016) 11. 63 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 639.
64 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 638, 657–60; BW Goodman, ‘A Step Towards Accountable
Algorithms?: Algorithmic Discrimination and the European Union General Data Protection’
(29th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, Barcelona, Spain, 2016) 3–4.
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deployment,65 and so the factors that inform a decision (and the resultant
outputs) may vary over time, reducing the utility of transparency-induced
disclosure.66 Equally, transparency as to when an algorithm is deployed may
not be meaningful unless it is possible to explain the underlying logic, or to
interrogate the input data.
Blockchain, an open distributed ledger system that records transactions,67 is
one technical tool that has been suggested as a potential solution.68 To date,
blockchain has been used to reconcile transactions distributed across various
entities within and between organisations. This existing ability to track items
and speciﬁc ﬁnancial transactions may be adapted and applied to the use of
speciﬁc data points throughout an algorithmic decision-making process. For
example, other authors have suggested that blockchain may be used to track
data provenance and to improve accountability in the use of data, by
verifying ‘if the data was accessed, used and transferred’ in compliance with
users’ consent.69 This could facilitate tracing back through a decision to see
which data points informed it and the weight they were given.
Nonetheless, the extent to which transparency challenges can be overcome is
a live debate, and a number of complicating factors arise. First, businesses have
an understandable proprietary interest in the algorithms they develop and somay
be unwilling to reveal the underlying code or logic.70 To overcome this
challenge, suggestions have been made that the algorithm does not have to be
made publicly transparent but rather could be subject to independent review
by an ombud for example.71 Second, transparency regarding an algorithm’s
code or underlying logic may be undesirable.72 This ‘inside’ knowledge may
facilitate the ‘gaming’ of the system,73 resulting in abuse, and improper
results. The risk is particularly clear in the context of security screening or tax
audits.74 In other situations, such as those involving ‘sensitive data’,
65 At a simpler level, algorithms themselves may be modiﬁed due to a normal update/
development system. 66 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 647–52.
67 MIT Technology Review Editors, ‘Explainer: What is a Blockchain?’ (MIT Technology
Review, 23 April 2018) <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610833/explainer-what-is-a-
blockchain/>.
68 M Burgess, ‘Holding AI to Account: Will Algorithms Ever Be Free from Bias if They’re
Created by Humans?’ (The Wired, 11 January 2016) <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/creating-
transparent-ai-algorithms-machine-learning>.
69 R Neisse, G Steri and I Nai-Fovino, ‘A Blockchain-based Approach for Data Accountability
and Provenance Tracking’ (12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security,
Reggio Calabria, Italy, August 2017) 1.
70 J Burrell, ‘How the Machine ‘Thinks’: Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms’ (2016) 3(1) Big Data & Society 3–4. 71 See Tutt (n 58) 117–18.
72 Some authors argue that transparency is not simply full informational disclosure, and that
notions of transparency against secrecy is a false dichotomy. See Ananny and Crawford (n 9)
979; Diakopoulos (n 56) 58–9.
73 Science & Technology Committee, Oral Evidence: Algorithms in Decision-Making (HC
2017–2019, 351), 12 December 2017 Evidence Session, Q112-113 <http://data.parliament.uk/
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/
algorithms-in-decisionmaking/oral/75798.pdf>. 74 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 639, 658.
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transparencymay be legally restricted.75 Third, the complex interaction between
algorithms and human agents is another source of opacity. When algorithms
assist human decision-making, it is diﬃcult to determine the inﬂuence of the
algorithm’s results on the ﬁnal decision, and to identify whether inappropriate
deference is given to the algorithm.76 As such, and irrespective of transparency
issues, it is also necessary to evaluate how algorithmic outputs inﬂuence human
decision-making within the context of the overall process. This is discussed in
greater detail in Part IV. Fourth, even if it is possible to fully explain the system’s
reasoning, an important question arises regarding the resources and expertise
required to do so.77 Addressing this question will involve assessments of the
cost of transparency against the reasons for using the algorithm in the ﬁrst
place (which may often relate to competitive pricing).
3. The gaps remaining in the accountability process
Transparency is essential to accountability but insuﬃcient of itself. This section
identiﬁes ﬁve additional factors necessary for eﬀective accountability, many of
which have either not been addressed or have not been evaluated holistically in
existing debates. First, a clear understanding of what constitutes ‘harm’ is a
prerequisite to, and benchmark for, evaluating risks and eﬀects of the use of
algorithms in decision-making. In the absence of an agreed understanding,
‘harm’ is open to a number of diﬀerent interpretations, and the understanding
adopted by a particular actor may fail to eﬀectively take into account the full
human rights impact of their actions. For instance, a business’ ‘community
values’ may not fully match IHRL. For example, they could focus on the
right to privacy but not incorporate the right to freedom of expression or the
prohibition of discrimination. Second, in order to prevent and protect against
harm, the overall decision-making process and the full life cycle of an
algorithm must be taken into account, and the speciﬁc role played by an
algorithm in any ﬁnal decision identiﬁed. Design, development and
deployment of algorithms are interconnected phases within an overall process
and decisions made in one phase may aﬀect human rights compliance in
another. For example, it may not be possible to monitor the potential
discriminatory impact of an algorithm if this is not built in during the
development phase. Equally, the role played by an algorithm in the ﬁnal
decision, such as whether it is used to make or inform that decision, will
impact upon the human rights considerations. Third, the obligations and
responsibilities of States and businesses respectively need to be ascertained
from the outset, noting that these will depend on their speciﬁc role at diﬀerent
stages of the overall decision-making process. Fourth, remedies for harm caused
75 ibid, 639.
76 See Diakopoulos (n 56) 57, 60; M Wilson, ‘Algorithms (and the) Everyday’ (2017) 20(1)
Information, Communication & Society 137, 141, 143–44, 147. 77 See Burrell (n 70) 4.
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must be addressed. To date, the concept of remedy has narrowly focused on
ﬁxing the operation of the algorithm where bias is identiﬁed, but the concept
of an eﬀective remedy under IHRL is much broader by focusing on the
individual(s) aﬀected as well as taking measures to ensure that the harm is
not repeated in the future. Fifth, an overall shift in focus may be required.
Existing approaches to accountability tend to focus on after-the-fact
accountability. While this is important, it is also crucial that accountability
measures are fully incorporated throughout the overall algorithmic life cycle,
from conception and design, to development and deployment.78 Discussion
in this regard is emerging, for instance with respect to whether and how
‘ethical values’ can be built into algorithms in the design phase,79 and
whether algorithms can themselves monitor for ethical concerns. While this is
a welcome start, the discussion needs to go further, and the operationalization of
the IHRL framework can play a signiﬁcant role in this regard.
Achieving eﬀective accountability is therefore a complex problem that
demands a comprehensive approach. Somewhat surprisingly, IHRL has been
neglected in existing discourse until relatively recently.80 While values such as
dignity,81 legal fairness, and procedural regularity in the design of algorithms82
are referenced in the literature, neither the range of substantive rights established
under IHRL, nor the possibility that IHRL provides a framework capable of
underpinning the overall algorithmic accountability process, have received
signiﬁcant attention. This is beginning to change with more actors starting to
support a human rights-based approach to the development and use of artiﬁcial
intelligence. The next part of this article contributes to these developments by
clearly setting out the speciﬁc contribution that IHRL can make. This article
advances an overall framework through which to address the issue of
algorithmic accountability, and adds depth to existing discussion.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK TO ALGORITHMIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
IHRL contributes to the algorithmic accountability discussion in three key
ways. First, it ﬁlls a gap in existing discourse by providing a means to deﬁne
78 Science & Technology Committee (n 73) Q207.
79 See Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Global Initiative on Ethics of
Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, ‘Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing
Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, (Version 2) (2017); M Ananny,
‘Towards an Ethics of Algorithms: Convening, Observation, Probability, and Timeliness’ (2016)
41(1) Science, Technology & Human Values 93, 94–6; L Jaume-Palasí and M Spielkamp,
‘Ethics and Algorithmic Processes for Decision Making and Decision Support’
(AlgorithmWatch, Working Paper No. 2, 2017) 9–13; Mittelstadt et al. (n 50) 10–12.
80 See discussion Part IIB.
81 C Cath et al., ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence and the ‘Good Society’: The US, EU, and UKApproach’
(2018) 24(2) Science & Engineering Ethics 505, 508.
82 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 637–8, 662–72, 678–9.
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and assess harm. Second, it imposes speciﬁc obligations on States and
expectations on businesses to prevent and protect human rights and sets out
the mechanisms and processes required to give eﬀect to or operationalize
these obligations and responsibilities. Third, the IHRL framework can map
on to the overall algorithmic life cycle and thus provides a means for
assessing the distinct responsibilities of diﬀerent actors across each stage of
the process. IHRL therefore establishes a framework capable of capturing the
full algorithmic life cycle from conception to deployment. Although we do
not suggest that IHRL provides an exclusive approach, it does provide a key
lens through which to analyse accountability. As such, it forms an important
dimension and organizer for algorithmic accountability that ﬁts together with
existing approaches such as transparency, explainability, and technical
solutions.83 Necessarily, the speciﬁcs of the approach will need to be further
developed and reﬁned in a multi- and interdisciplinary way.
A. IHRL as a Means for Assessing Harm
In the current discourse on ‘algorithmic accountability’ harm is regularly
referred to but often using vague or abstract terms such as unfairness, or by
reference to voluntary corporate policies.84 These terms make it diﬃcult to
pinpoint the exact nature of the harm and to assess whether and which legal
obligations attach. There is also a risk that the extent of potential harm is
underplayed or narrowly construed.85
The focus on ‘bias’ illustrates the risks arising in this regard. Within the
literature on algorithmic accountability, the term ‘bias’ (and less often
‘discrimination’) is used in a range of diﬀerent ways, often without clarity on
the meaning employed. It is sometimes used to convey a speciﬁc technical
meaning, for example with reference to statistical bias.86 In other contexts, it
83 The utility of this approach has recently been noted by others. See Amnesty International &
Access Now, ‘The Toronto Declaration: Protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination in
machine learning systems’ (16 May 2018) <https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/
05/Toronto-Declaration-D0V2.pdf>. The Toronto Declaration applies the human rights framework
with a focus on the right to equality and non-discrimination. This article proposes a human rights-
based framework based on the full range of substantive and procedural rights. See discussion Part
IIIA. 84 See eg Facebook, ‘Community Standards’, <https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/>.
85 In her oral evidence to the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee inquiry on
algorithms in decision-making, Sandra Wachter suggested that a more reﬁned harm taxonomy is
required to respond to the ethical and real-world problems that may be diﬃcult to predict at the
outset and ‘new harms and new kinds of discrimination’ arising from inferential analytics. See
Science & Technology Committee, Oral Evidence: Algorithms in Decision-Making (HC 351,
2017–2019) 14 November 2017 Evidence Session, Q55 <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/
committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/algorithms-in-
decisionmaking/oral/73859.pdf>. This paper agrees that a robust understanding for harm is
necessary, but argues that it is provided by existing deﬁnitions in IHRL.
86 C Dwork et al., ‘Fairness through Awareness’ (3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer
Science Conference, Cambridge, MA, January 2012) 215.
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is employed as a general, ‘catch-all’ term to mean some form of preference or
‘unfairness’ (which itself has been criticized as a vague term). When used in
such a broad way, actors may develop or gravitate to locally deﬁned
understandings as to what constitutes bias or discrimination, giving rise to a
variety of meanings. This can also create uncertainty for actors designing,
developing and using algorithms in decision-making as to whether a
particular instance of bias is unlawful.
Scholars sometimes indicate that unlawful bias may constitute a narrower
category under an overall heading of ‘bias’ but without concretely explaining
how.87 IHRL can make a central contribution in this regard as a counter to
general descriptors of ‘bias’ or ‘discrimination’ by providing a method for
understanding when bias and discrimination are unlawful. In this regard,
IHRL provides a concrete and universally applicable deﬁnition of harm that
is capable of identifying prohibited and unlawful forms of bias and
discrimination.88 This deﬁnition is accompanied by well-developed and
sophisticated tests for establishing when the prohibition of discrimination has
been violated, including what constitutes direct, indirect or intersectional
discrimination as well as structural and unconscious bias. IHRL therefore not
only provides a means to determine harm through its interpretation of how
rights may be interfered with, it also provides established tests to assess when
and how rights may have been violated.
The IHRL framework also oﬀers a deeper and fuller means of analysing the
overall eﬀect of the use of algorithms. This moves beyond the current singular
and narrow framings of harm which tend to focus on ‘bias’ or ‘privacy’ to look
at the full impact of algorithms on the rights of individuals and groups. For
example, the use of algorithms to aid sentencing and parole decisions have
been reported to be ‘biased’ against certain ethnic minorities.89 The IHRL
framework not only assesses whether such use violates the prohibition of
discrimination but also examines the impact from the perspective of the
individual’s right to a fair trial and to liberty. This broader approach is
essential as it captures the overall impact of algorithms and may indicate, for
example, that algorithms cannot be used in a particular context, even if
discrimination-related concerns are addressed.90
The IHRL framework therefore provides a means of categorizing and
labelling harm through its establishment of an internationally agreed set of
substantive and procedural rights which, if violated, constitute harm.
87 R Binns, ‘Fairness in Machine Learning: Lessons from Political Philosophy’ (Conference on
Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (New York, 2018) 3–5.
88 See eg UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 18 (Non-discrimination’
(10 November 1989) para 6.
89 J Angwin et al. (n 46); F Raso et al. (n 16) 21–4; RCaplan et al., ‘Algorithmic Accountability:
A Primer, Tech Algorithm Brieﬁng: How Algorithms Perpetuate Racial Bias and Inequality’ (Data
& Society, 18 April 2018) <https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Data_Society_Algorithmic_Accountability_Primer_FINAL-4.pdf. 90 See further Part IVA.
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Incorporating a means to assess (potential) harm is critical to developing an
eﬀective accountability framework for the use of algorithms in decision-
making. Importantly, the IHRL framework not only describes the nature of
harm but triggers an existing framework that attaches to these rights. As
discussed in the next section, this framework connects directly to concrete
legal obligations imposed on States to prevent and protect against such
violations, including with respect to the regulation of business actors, and
establishes clear expectations on businesses themselves as regards to the
actions necessary to respect human rights. IHRL thus brings clarity regarding
the actions that States and businesses are expected to take and the
consequences of failing to act.
B. Clearly Deﬁned Obligations and Expectations That Apply Across the
Algorithmic Life Cycle
By identifying the range of rights brought into play by the use of algorithms in
decision-making, IHRL establishes a clear set of obligations on States and
expectations on businesses to prevent and protect human rights across the
algorithmic life cycle. Focusing on existing legal obligations is critical as it
emphasizes that addressing the (potential) harm caused by the use of
algorithms in decision-making is not a voluntary exercise, as often appears to
be the implication in existing discourse and debates.91 This section analyses
how the IHRL framework applies across the life cycle of algorithms in order
to demonstrate its potential contribution to ﬁlling gaps in the current
accountability debate.
1. Identifying roles and responsibilities attached to diﬀerent entities across the
full algorithmic life cycle
IHRL requires that States put in place an accountability framework that prevents
violations from taking place, establishes monitoring and oversight mechanisms
as safeguards, and provides a means to access justice for individuals and groups
who claim that their rights have been violated.92 The components of this
accountability framework are necessarily interdependent, and apply across
the full algorithmic life cycle. This is illustrated in general terms in the
diagram below.
91 It is noted that, evenwhere international law does not impose direct obligations on businesses,
States’ obligations to protect against human rights violations requires that they take measure at the
domestic level to ensure that individuals’ human rights are not violated by businesses. States may be
held accountable for failure to take appropriate measures in this regard. See Ruggie Principles (n 14)
Principle 1.
92 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (n 13) paras 3–8; UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3 (n 13) paras 2–8.
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As IHRL traditionally focuses on State conduct, these obligations apply to the
actions or omissions of the State directly. This is important as States are
increasingly reported to be integrating algorithms within their decision-
making processes across a range of sectors that may have signiﬁcant
consequences for individuals and groups in areas such as policing,
sentencing, social security and the identiﬁcation of children at risk, as noted
above.93 IHRL also addresses business activity, by requiring the State to
protect against third-party harm, and by imposing speciﬁc expectations
directly on businesses. The principle of due diligence requires States to
prevent and protect individuals from harm by third parties, including business
enterprises. For instance, States are required to devise ‘appropriate steps to
prevent, investigate, punish and redress private actors’ abuse … [t]hey should
consider the full range of permissible preventative and remedial measures,
including policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication’.94 Human rights
standards and norms also apply directly to business enterprises, as articulated,
for example, in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the
93 See eg Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, ‘CIFAR Pan-Canadian Artiﬁcial
Intelligence Strategy’ <https://www.cifar.ca/ai/pan-canadian-artiﬁcial-intelligence-strategy>; E
Macron, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence: “Making France a Leader”’ (AI for Humanity Conference,
Collège de France, 30 March 2018) <https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/artiﬁcial-intelligence-
making-france-a-leader>; NITI Aayog, ‘National Institution for Transforming India (national
Strategy for Artiﬁcial Intelligence #AIFORALL’ (June 2018), <http://niti.gov.in/writereaddata/
ﬁles/document_publication/NationalStrategy-for-AI-Discussion-Paper.pdf>; Japan Strategic
Council for AI Technology, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence Technology Strategy’ (New Energy and
Industrial Technology Development Organization, 31 March 2017) <http://www.nedo.go.jp/
content/100865202.pdf>; AI Singapore, <https://www.aisingapore.org/>; UK Department for
Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Policy Paper: AI Sector Deal’ (26 April 2018) <https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/artiﬁcial-intelligence-sector-deal/ai-sector-deal>; US White
House, ‘Artiﬁcial Intelligence for the American People’ (10 May 2018) <https://www.
whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/artiﬁcial-intelligence-american-people/>.
94 See Ruggie Principles (n 14) Principle 1.
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Ruggie Principles). These principles establish an expectation that businesses
should prevent or mitigate ‘adverse human rights impact’, establish a means
of access to justice where human rights violations are alleged, and provide
remedies where rights are found to be breached. For both States and
businesses, giving eﬀect to these obligations or expectations requires
establishing monitoring and oversight mechanisms that apply throughout the
entire algorithmic process.
As discussed in the next sections, IHRL sets out the measures required if
States or businesses are to comply with human rights law: IHRL details the
actions that diﬀerent actors should take at each point in the process, from
conception to deployment. This facilitates a means of engaging with the
overall picture, both in terms of the process of developing and deploying
algorithms, and evaluating their impact. This portrayal of how to achieve a
holistic approach to accountability is currently absent from the discourse.
2. Operationalizing the measures necessary to ensure rights compliance
IHRL provides a range of measures to guide States in the implementation and
operationalisation of their obligations to prevent and protect human rights, and
to guide businesses regarding the actions they should take to respect human
rights. For example, the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) deﬁnes ‘direct prevention’ as ‘aim[ing] to eliminate risk
factors and establish a legal, administrative and policy framework which
seeks to prevent violations’.95 It notes that this obligation comprises a
number of diﬀerent elements, highlighting that some ‘provisions point to an
obligation of negative result (prevention being successful when there is no
violation), while in some cases prevention can be seen as an obligation of
positive conduct (taking all necessary steps to adopt concrete and eﬀective
measures to prevent violations)’.96 The prevention of harm is directly linked
to the obligation to respect, whereby States must refrain from taking
measures that will result in a human rights violation.97 The UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights apply this same requirement to
businesses, in terms of ‘[t]he responsibility of business enterprises to respect
human rights’.98 As discussed above, in ensuring that they respect human
rights, States and businesses need to ensure that policies and practices are in
place to identify and assess any actual or potential risks to human rights
posed by the use of algorithms in decision-making.
95 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights on ‘The Role of Prevention in the Promotion and Protection of HumanRights’ (16 July 2015)
UN Doc A/HRC/30/20, para 9. 96 ibid, para 7.
97 See eg UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment 14 The
right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, para 33.
98 Ruggie Principles (n 14) Principle 12.
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The IHRL framework provides further guidance as to the type of measures
that can operationalize the respect principle. The full life cycle approach
allows for existing algorithmic accountability proposals—relating, for
example, to auditing or impact assessments—to be situated within a
comprehensive process. This facilitates greater clarity and focus by setting
out what the objectives underpinning speciﬁc measures should be, their scope
and depth, what the indicators of eﬀectiveness are, and when measures should
be undertaken.
Impact assessments provide an example. As a result of a narrow
conceptualization of harm, impact assessments in an algorithmic context have
typically focused on issues relating to discrimination and privacy.99 The IHRL
framework contributes in three key ways. First, it clariﬁes the content of the
right to privacy and the prohibition of discrimination. This ensures that all
aspects of the rights—including indirect discrimination, for example—are
taken into account, while also facilitating consistency across assessments.
Second, the use of algorithms in decision-making can potentially aﬀect all
rights. The IHRL framework requires that impact assessments encompass the
full set of substantive and procedural rights under IHRL, and that analysis
not be unduly limited to privacy or discrimination. Third, the IHRL
framework underscores the need for risks to be monitored at all stages of the
algorithmic life cycle.100
Applying this in practice means that impact assessments should be conducted
during each phase of the algorithmic life cycle. During the design and
development stage, impact assessments should evaluate how an algorithm is
likely to work, ensure that it functions as intended and identify any
problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an opportunity to
modify the design of an algorithm at an early stage, to build in human rights
compliance—including monitoring mechanisms—from the outset, or to halt
development if human rights concerns cannot be addressed. Impact
assessments should also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to
monitor eﬀects during operation. As stated, this requires that, during design
and development, the focus should not only be on testing but steps should
also be taken to build in eﬀective oversight and monitoring processes that
will be able to identify and respond to human rights violations once the
algorithm is deployed. This ability to respond to violations is key as IHRL
requires that problematic processes must be capable of being reconsidered,
revised or adjusted.101
The establishment of internal monitoring and oversight bodies can play an
important role in coordinating and overseeing the implementation of regular
99 See eg K Crawford and J Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55(1) Boston College Law Review 93, 95; Kroll et al.
(n 9) 678.
100 For instance, indirect discrimination may only become visible during the deployment phase.
101 See OHCHR (n 95) para 31.
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impact assessments and ensuring that ﬁndings are addressed. Some businesses
in the AI sector have started to develop internal committees.102 The nature and
mandate of such committees has been subject to some commentary,103 and
reﬂects an evolving dimension to legal and policy debates on algorithmic
accountability.
Notwithstanding the nature of any internal processes, independent oversight
plays an important role in the AI sector as it does in other areas where decision-
making by States or businesses has the potential to adversely aﬀect human
rights. For instance, independent oversight is a core requirement with respect
to State surveillance activities.104 To date, similar oversight models have not
been introduced to the algorithmic decision-making context. However,
independent oversight mechanisms may be central to ensuring that States and
businesses comply with their respective human rights obligations and
responsibilities. They may provide an appropriate means to assess the
processes put in place by States and businesses, and may also provide expert
input vis-à-vis potential risks. An independent oversight body may also play
an essential role in determining whether algorithms can be used in certain
contexts, and if so, under what conditions, as discussed in the next part of
this article.105 Independent oversight may take a number of diﬀerent forms,
dependent upon factors such as the public or private function of the
algorithm during deployment. For algorithms deployed in a public decision-
making context, an independent body, established in legislation, and
suﬃciently resourced (including with appropriate technical expertise) may be
the most appropriate.106 The newly established UK Centre for Data Ethics
and Innovation is an interesting proposition in this regard. This body is
intended to strengthen the existing algorithmic governance landscape,107 but
its role is limited to the provision of advice: it is an ‘advisory body that will
102 See eg Microsoft, ‘Satya Nadella Email to Employees: Embracing Our Future: Intelligent
Cloud and Intelligent Edge’ (Microsoft, 29 March 2018) <https://news.microsoft.com/2018/03/
29/satya-nadella-email-to-employees-embracing-our-future-intelligent-cloud-and-intelligent-edge/
>; S Pichai, ‘AI at Google: Our Principles’ (Google, 7 June 2018) <https://www.blog.google/
technology/ai/ai-principles/>; DeepMind, ‘DeepMind Ethics & Society’ <https://deepmind.com/
applied/deepmind-ethics-society/>.
103 A Hern, ‘DeepMind Announces Ethics Group to Focus on Problems of AI’ (The Guardian, 4
October 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/04/google-deepmind-ai-
artiﬁcial-intelligence-ethics-group-problems>; J Temperton, ‘DeepMind’s New AI Ethics Unit Is
The Company’s Next Big Move’ (The Wired, 4 October 2017) <https://www.wired.co.uk/article/
deepmind-ethics-and-society-artiﬁcial-intelligence>; T Simonite, ‘Tech Firms Move To Put
Ethical Guard Rails Around AI’ (The Wired, 16 May 2018) <https://www.wired.com/story/tech-
ﬁrms-move-to-put-ethical-guard-rails-around-ai/>.
104 See Zakharov v Russia, App No 47143/06 (ECtHR, 4 December 2015) para 233.
105 See Parts IVA and IVB.
106 See, by way of analogy to security oversight, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights, ‘Issue Paper: Democratic and Eﬀective Oversight of National Security Services’ (Council of
Europe, 2015) 47.
107 UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation:
Consultation’ (June 2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/715760/CDEI_consultation__1_.pdf> 10.
International Human Rights Law—Algorithmic Accountability 331
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589319000046
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Essex, on 25 Apr 2019 at 13:23:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
investigate and advise on how [the UK] govern[s] the use of data and data-
enabled technologies’.108 As such, it cannot qualify as an eﬀective oversight
body. However, it is conceived, at least in part, as an interim measure to
‘allow the government time to test the value and utility of the Centre’s
functions ahead of the creation of a future statutory advisory body’.109
Recently, Canada produced a white paper addressing ‘Responsible Artiﬁcial
Intelligence in the Government of Canada’, which highlighted the need for an
oversight body to review automated decision-making, and to provide advice to
ministers during the design of AI systems.110 Lessons learned from experiences
such as these may provide valuable insight going forward. Independent
oversight bodies established to monitor State surveillance activity and
analysis of their eﬀectiveness may also provide points of reference and
comparison.111 Other models being proposed include dedicated ombuds for
the AI sector or the expansion of the mandate of existing ombuds to address
these issues as well as industry regulatory bodies.112
In the event that violations are found to have occurred, IHRL imposes a
number of requirements: measures must be put in place to prevent any
reoccurrences, those aﬀected must be provided with eﬀective reparation, and
those responsible must be held to account. Within current accountability
debates, however, there is often a narrow focus on addressing problems with
the use of an algorithm, in order to ﬁx the issue and prevent reoccurrences.113
This is, of course, an important measure, and one that aligns with IHRL
requirements, particularly those relating to the concept of guarantees of non-
repetition. However, under the IHRL framework this is just one component
of a larger process. In order for individuals and groups to challenge the
impact of the use of algorithms in decision-making, IHRL requires that States
and businesses provide a means to access justice for those with an arguable
claim that their rights have been violated. Given the lack of transparency in
this area, broad standing provisions may be necessary, in order to enable
individuals to bring claims if they suspect but cannot prove that they have
been adversely aﬀected by an algorithmic decision-making process. States
108 UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, ‘Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation:
Government Response to Consultation’ (November 2018) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/757509/
Centre_for_Data_Ethics_and_Innovation_-_Government_Response_to_Consultation.pdf> 5.
109 ibid, 12.
110 Government of Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘Responsible Artiﬁcial
Intelligence in the Government of Canada: Digital Disruption White Paper Series’ (Version 2.0, 10
April 2018) <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Sn-qBZUXEUG4dVk909eSg5qvfbpNlRhzIef
WPtBwbxY/edit> 32–3.
111 See, for instance, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Oﬃce established to oversee the
UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016.
112 See C Miller, J Ohrvik-Scott and R Coldicutt, ‘Regulating for Responsible Technology:
Capacity, Evidence and Redress’ (Doteveryone, October 2018).
113 See Kitchin (n 1) 17; M Hardt, E Price and N Srebro, ‘Equality of Opportunity in Supervised
Learning’ 2 (30th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, Barcelona, Spain, 2016).
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and businesses may develop internal processes for individuals to submit
complaints to them directly, although there is currently debate on whether
complainants should be required to use such processes, where they are not
independent of the entity concerned.114 What is critical, therefore, is that
States establish complaints mechanisms such as ombuds and eﬀective judicial
remedies. Determining which entity (or entities) is responsible for a particular
harm is equally essential in order to allocate responsibility for providing an
eﬀective remedy. The approach to remedy within the algorithmic
accountability discussion needs much greater attention, including
examination of the possibility that remedies could themselves be driven by
algorithms.
3. Integrating a rigorous accountability framework
By situating obligations and expectations across the life cycle of an algorithm,
what is required of the diﬀerent actors involved becomes clearer. This is
particularly important given the number of diﬀerent entities that may be
involved across the algorithmic life cycle, and the fact that algorithms may be
sold and deployed in a variety of diﬀerent contexts. Indeed, various public-
sector organizations have already integrated the use of algorithms into their
decision-making processes. For example, in the UK the ‘Harm Assessment
Risk Tool’ (also known as ‘HART’) is used by Durham Constabulary
to determine which individuals are eligible for an out-of-court process,
intended to reduce future oﬀending. The tool was developed by statistical
experts based at the University of Cambridge in collaboration with Durham
Constabulary.115 Elsewhere in the UK local governments have been using
products and services developed by private companies in areas such as child
safeguarding, welfare services, and education.116 This dimension has been
raised, but not adequately explored, in existing discourse. The IHRL
framework incorporates the diversity of actors involved, and allows for
nuance with respect to the obligations or expectations imposed on diﬀerent
actors.
For instance, the obligation/responsibility to respect requires that an entity
developing an algorithm identify any potential harm to rights, and take
114 LMcGregor, ‘Activating the Third Pillar of the UNGPs on the Right to an Eﬀective Remedy’
(EJIL: Talk!, 23 November 2018) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/activating-the-third-pillar-of-the-
ungps-on-access-to-an-eﬀective-remedy/>.
115 M Oswald et al., ‘Algorithmic Risk Assessment Policing Models: Lessons From the Durham
HART Model and ‘Experimental’ Proportionality’ (2018) 27(2) Information & Communications
Technology Law 223, 225.
116 See, for example, London Ventures <https://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/our-key-themes/
london-ventures>; Data Justice Lab, ‘Digital Technologies and the Welfare System, Written
Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human rights Consultation
on the UK’ (14 September 2018) <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Epoverty/
UnitedKingdom/2018/Academics/DataJusticeLabCardiﬀUniversity.pdf> 2–3.
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measures to protect against that harm. If the algorithm is to be sold, the
developer must also consider future third-party deployments. This may
require clariﬁcation or elaboration of a number of requirements, such as the
intended circumstances of use, the volume and quality of input data required,
or the statistical accuracy of the results. This is a means of satisfying the
developer’s own human rights obligations/responsibilities and facilitating
human rights compliance by any subsequent users. If an algorithm is sold,
the purchaser’s human rights obligations or responsibilities are also brought
into play; ie the purchaser must perform their own impact assessment and
deploy the algorithm in line with the developer’s speciﬁcations. If the
purchaser subsequently modiﬁes the circumstances of use, they will
necessarily have to carry out further impact assessments. The IHRL
framework accordingly allows for a division and allocation of
responsibilities. For instance, if the original developer fulﬁls their human
rights obligations, then they cannot be held responsible for subsequent third-
party misuse, and responsibility will accordingly lie with the purchaser.
Equally, if the purchaser deploys the algorithm appropriately (ie in line with
their human rights obligations) but a problem arises as a result of the
developer’s lack of compliance, then responsibility lies with the developer
not the purchaser.117
To summarize, IHRL deﬁnes harm in a universally accepted form and sets out
the speciﬁc obligations or expectations that apply to the diﬀerent actors involved
across each stage of the algorithmic life cycle. IHRL also details the means
necessary to ensure human rights compliance, setting out the diﬀerent
mechanisms that may be employed, and clarifying the objectives
underpinning these measures. By looking at the overall algorithmic life cycle,
and requiring that human rights obligations/expectations are taken into account
from the conception stage, the IHRL framework also facilitates eﬀective
accountability and compliance. For instance, it may be diﬃcult if not
impossible to detect harm at the deployment stage if oversight mechanisms
are not built in during development. Equally, if potential indirect
discrimination is not identiﬁed by a pre-deployment impact assessment, the
consequences for aﬀected individuals or groups may be signiﬁcant.
Ultimately, the comprehensive full life cycle overview approach facilitated
by the IHRL framework is essential in order to ensure that technology serves,
rather than undermines, human and societal interests.
The IHRL framework clearly sets out the measures that all actors should
take—and which States must take—in order to ensure that the design,
development and deployment of algorithms is undertaken in a human-rights-
compliant manner. It is a clear expectation of the international community
117 This example is provided for illustrative purposes. It is not intended to be an absolute guide to
responsibility: this is something that must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
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that businesses fulﬁl their responsibility to respect human rights.118 The
framework elaborated above provides a road map in this regard.
IV. THE EFFECT OF APPLYING THE IHRL FRAMEWORK TO THE USE OF ALGORITHMS IN
DECISION-MAKING
This part analyses how the application of the IHRL framework may aﬀect
decisions regarding the development and deployment of algorithms. To
reiterate, the application of the IHRL framework is intended to ensure that
the potential inherent in technology can be realized, while at the same time
ensuring that technological developments serve society. As such, the
increasing centrality of algorithms in public and private life should be
underpinned by a framework that attends to human rights. This is not
intended to be anti-technology or anti-innovation, it is directed at human-
rights-compliant, socially beneﬁcial, innovation.
A. Are There Red Lines That Prohibit the Use of Algorithms in Certain
Instances?
Most of the debates on algorithmic accountability proceed from the assumption
that the use of algorithms in decision-making is permissible. However, as noted
at the outset of this article, a number of situations arise wherein the use of
algorithms in decision-making may be prohibited. The IHRL framework
assists in determining what those situations might be, and whether a
prohibition on the use of algorithms in a particular decision-making context
is absolute, or temporary, ie until certain deﬁciencies are remedied. This
question should ﬁrst be addressed during the conception phase, before actual
design and development is undertaken, but should also be revisited as the
algorithm develops through the design and testing phase and into
deployment. In this regard, we envisage a number of scenarios in which the
use of algorithms in decision-making would be contrary to IHRL.
1. Prohibition of the use of algorithms to circumvent IHRL
First, and most straightforwardly, IHRL prohibits the use of an algorithm in
decision-making if the purpose or eﬀect of its use would circumvent IHRL.
This may occur if the intent of using an algorithm is to unlawfully
discriminate against a particular group or if the eﬀect of an algorithm is such
that it results in indirect discrimination, even if unintentionally. In such
scenarios, the use of the algorithm in decision-making would be prohibited as
long as discriminatory eﬀects exist. However, as discussed above, these eﬀects
could be overcome, if identiﬁed in the conceptualization and design phase or
118 Ruggie Principles (n 14) Principles 11, 12.
International Human Rights Law—Algorithmic Accountability 335
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589319000046
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Essex, on 25 Apr 2019 at 13:23:27, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
through internal and/or external oversight processes, and the algorithm
modiﬁed and reﬁned to remove any discriminatory bias, although a remedy
would still be required to any individuals adversely aﬀected.
A recent study conducted by researchers at Stanford University exempliﬁes
this point. This study focused on how deep neural networks can extract facial
features. The authors hypothesized that neural networks are better at detecting,
interpreting, and perceiving facial cues than the human brain. The test involved
comparing how deep neural networks performed compared to humans in
determining sexual orientation from a set of facial images stored on a dating
site. The study assumed that the sexual orientation of the individual could be
inferred from the gender of the partners they were looking for on their dating
proﬁle. They concluded that ‘deep neural networks are more accurate than
humans at detecting sexual orientation from facial images’.119 The authors
argued that they carried out the research to generate public awareness about
the risks that technology could be used in this way.120
The study was heavily criticized in the media, and by academics and civil
society.121 A key point was whether technology should be used for the
purpose of determining a person’s sexual orientation, particularly as it could
result in individuals and communities being targeted for abuse, and possibly
put their lives at risk.122 In general, human determination regarding the
sexual orientation of another person is prohibited since IHRL emphasizes
self-identiﬁcation regarding sexual orientation as integral to one’s
personality, and fundamental to self-determination, dignity and freedom.123 If
technology is deployed to carry out a task which would be prohibited if carried
out by a human, it follows that the deployment of the technology would also be
prohibited. Of course, in cases where discriminatory eﬀects are identiﬁed and
the algorithm can be modiﬁed accordingly to remove those eﬀects, it is
possible that the algorithm may then be deployed. Any aﬀected individuals
remain entitled to a remedy.
119 Y Wang and M Kosinki, ‘Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate Than Humans at
Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial Images’ (2018) 114(2) Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology 246, 254.
120 H Murphy, ‘Why Stanford Researchers Tried to Create a ‘‘Gaydar’ Machine’’ (New York
Times, 9 October 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/science/stanford-sexual-
orientation-study.html?_r=0>.
121 S Levin, ‘LGBT Groups Denounce ‘Dangerous’ AI that Uses Your Face to Guess Sexuality’
(The Guardian, 9 September 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/08/ai-gay-
gaydar-algorithm-facial-recognition-criticism-stanford>; D Anderson, ‘GLAAD and HRC Call
on Stanford University & Responsible Media to Debunk Dangerous & Flawed Report Claiming
to Identify LGBTQ People through Facial Recognition Technology’ (GLAAD Blog, 8
September 2017) <https://www.glaad.org/blog/glaad-and-hrc-call-stanford-university-responsible-
media-debunk-dangerous-ﬂawed-report>. 122 See Anderson (n 121).
123 The Yogyakarta Principles: Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law
in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (March 2007) Principle 3.
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2. Prohibition of the exclusive use of algorithms to make certain decisions
Second, IHRL may prohibit certain decisions that are made exclusively on the
basis of an algorithm, without the possibility of human intervention. In cases
where an individual’s rights are interfered with by a decision involving
algorithms, the underlying reasoning must be made on the basis of factors
speciﬁc and relevant to that individual. This derives from the prohibition of
arbitrary rights interference as a core principle underpinning IHRL and is
therefore relevant to all decisions that have the potential to interfere with
particular rights.124
Modern algorithms raise issues in the context of arbitrariness as, given the
nature of big data-driven algorithms, (a) decisions may be based on group-
level characteristics, ie x members of a group are likely to behave in a
particular way, as opposed to individually-focused characteristics, ie a
speciﬁc individual is likely to act in a particular way because of factors
speciﬁc to that individual, and (b) decisions are often based on correlation and
not causation. These two factors are interrelated. They indicate that analysis vis-
à-vis likely future behaviour is valid only at the group and not at the individual
level, and that predictions are not determinative as to how a speciﬁc individual
will act.125 Thesemodels fail to account for individual agency, and the relevance
of individual choice. This raises concerns that algorithmic decisions applied to
individuals may, in certain cases, be inherently inconsistent with the prohibition
of arbitrary interference with rights.126
These characteristics suggest that while algorithms may be used as a piece of
evidence within a decision, they cannot provide the sole basis for a decision that
directly aﬀects an individual’s rights: some form of human involvement or
oversight is necessary. For instance, the application of IHRL indicates that a
sentencing, bail or parole decision can never be decided exclusively by an
algorithm. These decisions directly aﬀect an individual’s right to liberty, a
central component of which is the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.127 This requires, amongst other factors, that detention, or continued
detention, be based upon reasons speciﬁc to the individual in question.128
The nature of algorithmic decision-making inherently precludes this
possibility as analysis is conducted on the basis of group behaviour, and
124 See eg UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of
Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, paras 21–22, 24–30,
33–35; UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on
The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ (n 16) para 10; Zakharov v Russia (n 104) para 230;
Khan v The United Kingdom App No 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000) para 26; Kroon and
Others v The Netherlands App No 18535/91 (ECtHR, 27 October 1994) para 31.
125 The role of human agency is also an important consideration, noting that individuals may
change their behaviour in unexpected—and unpredictable—ways.
126 See discussion Part IIA.
127 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and Security of
Person’ (16 December 2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/35, para 10.
128 ibid, paras 12, 15, 18, 22, 25, 36.
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correlation not causation.129 Exclusive reliance on algorithmic decision-making
in this context must be considered arbitrary and therefore prohibited.130
B. Safeguards Required to Permit the Use of Algorithms
In other situations, whether the use of an algorithm within a decision is
compatible with IHRL may depend upon the safeguards embedded within the
process, including the level and type of human involvement. These safeguards
are centred on ensuring that an algorithm operates eﬀectively, within acceptable
parameters. For instance, social media companies are currently engaged in
eﬀorts to moderate content in light of the alleged use of their platforms to
promote terrorism or propagate hate speech.131 This is a diﬃcult task that
directly brings the right to freedom of expression into play; there is a danger
that the removal of posts may be inconsistent with IHRL—a post may be
oﬀensive but not illegal—and therefore violate the poster’s right to freedom
of expression.132 Given the complexity of rights at issue, algorithms are used
to ﬂag, ﬁlter and classify certain content, but teams of human moderators
ultimately decide how content or a particular user account should be
managed. In this case, human input acts as a form of safeguard intended to
ensure that content is not wrongly restricted or removed by algorithms.
Another key consideration is not only whether safeguards are in place but
also whether they are able to operate eﬀectively. This issue may be
demonstrated by considering the role of the ‘human in the loop’. A human
decision-maker is considered to be ‘in the loop’ when they are involved in
the decision-making process, for instance when they make a decision
informed by an algorithmic output or when they provide oversight in relation
to the algorithmic decision-making process.133 However, the presence of a
human operator does not guarantee that safeguards are eﬀective. For
example, questions arise about the operator’s ability to meaningfully
understand the algorithmic decision-making process, their capacity to
determine whether and how any human rights have been aﬀected, and the
extent to which they automatically or subconsciously defer to the algorithmic
decision. Deference may arise, for example, due to perceptions of the
neutrality and accuracy of technology and concerns about going against
129 As discussed in Part IIA.
130 This appears to be the conclusion reached by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wisconsin v
Eric L. Loomis, discussed further in Part IVB.
131 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression on Freedom of Expression, States
and the Private Sector in the Digital Age’ (11 May 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/38, paras 35–37.
132 S Cope, JCYork and JGillula, ‘Industry Eﬀorts to Censor Pro-TerrorismOnline Content Pose
Risks to Free Speech’ (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 12 July 2017) <https://www.eﬀ.org/
deeplinks/2017/07/industry-eﬀorts-censor-pro-terrorism-online-content-pose-risks-free-speech>.
133 See Part IIA.
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the ﬁndings of such technology.134 This creates a risk that algorithms become
the de facto sole decision-maker, even if there is apparently some human input.
A recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the USA regarding the
use of algorithmic risk assessments in sentencing decisions demonstrates this
point. In State of Wisconsin v Eric L. Loomis, the Court had to assess
whether the use of an algorithmic risk assessment tool to determine if the
defendant could be supervised within the community rather than detained
violated the defendant’s right to due process.135 As the Court noted,
risk scores are intended to predict the general likelihood that those with a similar
history of oﬀending are either less likely or more likely to commit another crime
following release from custody. However, the COMPAS risk assessment does not
predict the speciﬁc likelihood that an individual oﬀender will reoﬀend. Instead, it
provides a prediction based on a comparison of information about the individual
to a similar data group.136
The defendant challenged the use of the risk assessment tool on the basis that the
proprietary interest in the algorithm meant that he could not challenge its
‘scientiﬁc validity’137 or ‘accuracy’ because Northpointe (the company that
owned the algorithm) ‘does not disclose how the risk scores are determined
or how the factors are weighed’.138 He argued that this denied him ‘an
individualized sentence’, and ‘it improperly uses gendered assessments’.139
In this case, the Court found that a risk assessment tool could be used to
inform a decision, but it could not be determinative.140 On its face, this
appears to be compatible with IHRL and the ‘red line’ test outlined above.
However, the level of scrutiny applied when analysing how the algorithm
reached its conclusions must also be addressed to determine if the safeguards
were in fact eﬀective.141 As noted above, this relates to both the nature of the
data inputs and how the algorithm uses that data.
The ﬁrst key point is that the use of risk assessment tools was considered by
the Court as part of a move towards evidence-based sentencing.142 Framing risk
assessment tools as evidence-based already presents the use of algorithms in
decision-making as something more objective than other types of judgments,
such as a judge’s intuition or a correctional oﬃcer’s standard practice.143
Without entering into a wider discussion on the merits of this approach, it
raises the perceived objectivity of algorithmic outcomes which is relevant
134 See Kroll et al. (n 9) 680 fn 136; DK Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’ (2008) 85(6)
WashLRev 1249, 1283–4. 135 State of Wisconsin v Eric L. Loomis (n 42) para 7.
136 ibid, para 15. 137 ibid, para 6. 138 ibid, para 51. 139 ibid, para 34.
140 ibid, para 88.
141 See Science & Technology Committee (n 73) Q132 (Martin Wattenberg, Google, evidence
arguing for a ‘very high level of scrutiny’ to the use of algorithms in the criminal justice system).
142 State of Wisconsin v Eric L. Loomis (n 42) para 3. 143 ibid, para 40.
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when considering the risk that judges and other decision-makers might defer to
algorithms because they are technologically produced.144
Second, the Court acknowledged that a proprietary interest prevented the
defendant understanding how the algorithm weighed and analysed the input
data.145 However, it found that the opportunity to challenge the risk score
itself, as well as the input data (as relevant to him) was suﬃcient,146 provided
certain safeguards were in place such as information being provided to the Court
on whether (1) a cross-validation study had been conducted, (2) the scores
‘raised questions about whether they disproportionately classify minority
oﬀenders as having a higher risk of recidivism’, and (3) the tools are
‘monitored and re-normed for accuracy due to changing populations and
subpopulations’.147 The Court asserted that this would enable courts to
‘better assess the accuracy of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be
given to the risk score’.148
The information sought by the Court about potential bias appears to introduce
levels of scrutiny to how the risk scores will be weighted. However, it provides
no indication regarding how this will be conducted in a way that ensures
objectivity. It thus potentially undermines the evidence-based approach the
Court seeks to achieve.149 Moreover, the safeguards only introduce the
potential of less weight being given to the risk score rather than excluding it
as evidence. They still do not enable the defendant—or another body—to
assess how information about him and other persons with similar proﬁles
were weighed and what inferences were made to produce an eventual risk
score. Therefore, the Court appeared to consider only the input data and the
overall outcome relevant to due process. However, as argued above, the way
in which the algorithm itself functions can lead to violations of human rights,
and must be addressed.
Thus, even if not determinative, the algorithmic decision in this case had a
signiﬁcant bearing on one of the most important human rights, the right to
liberty. This case demonstrates the risk that courts and other bodies may pay
an unwarranted level of deference to algorithms, meaning that while a human
may be ‘in the loop’, their role in the loop may actually be minimal.150 In areas
such as sentencing and bail applications, there may be a greater deference to
algorithms where actors are concerned about going against the ﬁndings of an
algorithm, in case they are then blamed if a person released goes on to
144 See eg O’Neil (n 32) (critiquing the assumption that big data algorithms are objective and
fair). 145 See State v Loomis (n 42) para 54. 146 ibid, para 53, 55–6. 147 ibid, para 66.
148 ibid.
149 See Finogenov & Others v Russia App Nos 18299/03 and 27311/03 (ECtHR, 4 June 2012),
para 270, the court stated that ‘the materials and conclusions of the investigation should be
suﬃciently accessible’.
150 This is contrary to the minimum standards of thoroughness and eﬀectiveness for
investigations that demands adequate and rigorous analysis of all relevant elements by competent
relevant professionals. See ibid, para 271; UNHuman Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31
(n 13) para 15.
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commit a crime. On one level, this is understandable, as the human decision-
maker is unlikely to want to ‘go against the computer’ and then explain their
reasoning for doing so should they ‘get it wrong’. However, it is precisely
these situations that involve fundamental rights, such as the right to liberty,
and that therefore require particular protection.151
C. Responsibilities in Areas in Which Algorithmic Eﬀect Is Not Possible to
Predict
Finally, the increasing complexity of algorithms and their possible future
autonomy may mean that it is diﬃcult for humans to predict the impact they
will have. For example, others have asked, ‘[w]hat happens when algorithms
write algorithms? Algorithms in the past have been created by a programmer…
In the future theywill likely be evolved by intelligent/learningmachines.Wemay
not even understand where they came from’.152 This has resulted in debate over
whether humans should have reduced responsibility for the actions of algorithms
if humans cannot predict what algorithms will do.153 At the conceptualization
stage, therefore, actors may claim that they cannot predict whether or not the
algorithm will result in human rights interferences or violations.
In these circumstances, the actor is taking the decision to use an algorithm in
full knowledge that it cannot predict the eﬀect it will have. From an IHRL
perspective, this does not automatically reduce the level of responsibility.
This is because human entities (primarily in the form of States or businesses)
make the decision to design and deploy algorithms. These actors remain
subject to an obligation to ensure that their use of algorithms does not result
in human rights violations, even if unintended. Thus, under IHRL, blanket
assertions of reduced responsibility would be rejected; if the speciﬁc outcome
of an algorithmic decision cannot be predicted, the parameters within which a
decision is made should nonetheless be clear. For example, if in the conception
or design phase actors claim that they cannot predict how the algorithm might
perform or anticipate risks that might arise because of the complexity and
sophistication of the particular algorithm, this would not reduce
responsibility. Rather, if the actor decided to proceed with the use of the
algorithm, such a decision might actually result in heightened responsibility.
Thus, the IHRL framework pushes back on the developing discourse on
reduced human responsibility or distributed responsibility between humans
151 See Finogenov &Others v Russia (n 149) para 271 andHusayn (Abu Zubadyh) v PolandApp
No 7511/13 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014) para 480—in both cases the Court stated that “a requirement of a
“thorough investigation” means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to ﬁnd out
what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or
as the basis of their decisions’; Paul & Audrey Edwards v UKApp No 46477/99 (ECtHR, 14March
2002) para 71;MapiripánMassacre v Colombia, Judgment, Inter-American Court of HumanRights
Series C No 134 (15 September 2005) para 224. 152 See Rainie and Anderson (n 1) 55.
153 See Mittelstadt et al. (n 50) 11–12.
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and machines as the starting point.154 IHRL responds to this unpredictability by
requiring actors to build in human rights protections so that where an algorithm
acts unpredictably, safeguards are in place. This includes the proposals by some
scientists to explore whether human rights and other ethical principles could be
‘baked into’ the algorithmic process so that the algorithmwould act according to
these norms and also be capable of alerting the human supervisor to
problems.155
V. CONCLUSION
Existing approaches to algorithmic accountability are important, but of
themselves do not address the full complexity of the issue. IHRL can provide
an appropriate framework that takes into account the overall algorithmic life
cycle, as well as the diﬀerentiated responsibility of all the actors involved.
Adopting an IHRL framework can: take advantage of both current and future
approaches to prevention, safeguards, monitoring and oversight, and remedy;
incorporate broadly accepted understandings as to the conduct that
constitutes ‘harm’; and provide guidance with respect to the circumstances in
which algorithmic decision-making may be employed. Mapping the
algorithmic life cycle against the human rights framework provides clear red
lines where algorithms cannot be used, as well as necessary safeguards for
ensuring compatibility with human rights. Overall, it strengthens the
protections for individuals who are caught in a power imbalance against
entities that rely on technologically advanced algorithmic decision-making
tools, as it ensures that responsibility is exercised and not deferred.
As stated at the outset, this article is intended to facilitate a discussion as to the
role of IHRL in relation to the design, development, and deployment of
algorithms, and to provide guidance as to how the IHRL framework can
substantively inform this process. Although IHRL does not currently
establish binding obligations on business enterprises, it requires States to
address third-party harm and establishes clear expectations of businesses, as
set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, and
this area of IHRL continues to evolve. It is these measures that businesses
should apply if they are to comply with human rights, and in order to ensure
that they ‘do no harm’.
154 See L Floridi and JW Sanders, ‘On the Morality of Artiﬁcial Agents’ (2004) 14(3) Minds &
Machines 349, 351; GD Crnkovic and B Çürüklü, ‘Robots: Ethical by Design’ (2012) 14(1) Ethics
& Information Technology 61, 62–3; A Matthias, ‘The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing
Responsibility for the Actions of Learning Automata’ (2004) 6(3) Ethics & Information
Technology 175, 177.
155 For example, in some industries where the use of automated technology is more developed
such as the use of autopilot programmes in aviation, errors in operation can still give rise to
responsibility of the pilot and/or liability of the company.
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This article has focused on presenting an approach capable of informing the
decision-making process – as it relates to the entirety of the algorithmic life
cycle – and on providing guidance as to the steps that States and businesses
should take to avoid human rights violations. As such, a discussion regarding
the role of established human rights mechanisms has been outside the scope of
this article. However, these mechanisms can play a critical role in
operationalizing existing IHRL so that it makes a contribution and can help
shape and address current gaps in algorithmic accountability. Of particular
importance at this nascent stage of the discussion are those mechanisms that
can help to inform the development of a human rights-based approach and
facilitate its incorporation into mainstream discussions. Key in this regard are
the Oﬃce of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special
Procedures established by the Human Rights Council. As algorithmic
decision-making potentially aﬀects all human rights, a joint statement by a
number of UN Treaty Bodies may also be appropriate.156 Regional human
rights mechanisms and Treaty Bodies will also play an important role in
addressing suspected violations arising in this regard, and their case law can
assist as regards a deeper and more day-to-day understanding of the human
rights law framework. This focus on international mechanisms should not,
however, distract from the essential role played by national bodies, such as
the independent oversight mechanisms discussed in Part IIIB.
Ultimately, much work remains to be done both to operationalize the IHRL
framework and to then ensure that it is applied.
156 See, for instance, a joint statement issued by the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, addressing 50 years of the Covenants. Joint
Statement by the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, ‘The International Covenants onHumanRights: 50 Years On’ (17November 2016)
UN Doc CCPR/C/2016/1-E/C.12/2016/3.
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